Power Politics in the WTO.

In theory the WTO is a highly democratic institution. Practice however is theory’s diametrical opposition. The Secretariat is all but neutral, voting is completed on a high-pressure basis and closed meetings with restricted participation undermine the idea of transparency.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in theory a democratic institution based on the consensus model and the principal of one country one vote. Theory in this case is often diametrically opposed to the practical facts of realpolitikk in world trade. This contradiction is apparent in a variety of instances, some of which we will investigate in this article.
The examples we could provide are many and the instances in which they incur are large and varied. For reasons of length and simplicity we have chosen to investigate only certain fields of democratic misconduct. The instances we wish to focus on are: a) the so-called neutrality of the Secretariat. b) Economic and political pressure applied bilaterally prior to voting. c) Exclusion from meetings.

The Secretariat: Negotiator or mediator?
The case of the Secretariat is such that in theory this is supposed to be a neutral role. The Secretariat is supposedly only to have the role of facilitator, and not that of a mediator. Upon closer inspection however, it becomes evident that this is a rhetorical hoax. In article VI.4 of the WTO it is stated that: “The … director general and the … Secretariat shall be exclusively international in character.” And further: “shall not seek or accept instructions from any government or any other authority external to the WTO.” In theory all is good. In practice however, all is not. Firstly, the secretariat as a whole is mostly composed of representatives from the developed countries, even though they represent a minority in the WTO. Secondly, the director general has as of yet not not been of a EU or USA origin. Thirdly, and more importantly, there are a series of situations where the director general has far overstepped his so-called neutral standing. Such instances include former director general Mike Moore appointing people to Secretariat posts based on personal politics. One relevant example here is the promotion of Chiedu Osakwe after he had supported Mike Moore’s election as Director General. Further complaints include the fact that he was accused of negotiating on behalf of the EU in Doha. The Secretariat is also overly involved in the drafting of negotiating texts, thus strongly affecting the outcome of final resolutions.
Developing countries have further complained that the technical assistance provided by the Secretariat is strongly biased, giving advise based upon the wishes of the stronger members, and that in their roles as minute writers, they often manipulate the results of the meetings. As is quoted by an African delegate: “they write what they want you to say, rather than what you actually said.”

Bilateral pressure
To move on to the argument that member states are pressured bilaterally through political and economical means, there is a large amount of evidence to support this. One of the most famous examples is the infamous aid package Pakistan received the day after the Doha round had successfully been completed. November 14. 2001 the Doha round was successfully completed, and Pakistan, which had previously been negative to the resolution, had abstained from voting against. The very next day Pakistan concluded a deal with Washington that was to give them a US$ 1billion aid package. The EU followed suit and provided Pakistan with increased textile quotas, and political recognition of President Musharraf’s rule. This is of course one of the more blatant examples of such bilateral economic pressure, and the strongly embedded powers of the wealthy inherit in the system.
The blatancy is not always eminent, but there are a series of other examples. We will provide some others before we move on to the third case for argument. In Doha for example, the 11th September attacks were used for all they were worth, and several negotiators were faced with the argument that passing this bill is part of the war on terror – the old with us or against us rhetoric. Other negotiators were faced with personal pressure, and for fear of losing their jobs softened their position. In other instances Washington realized that the strength of the opposition was due to the fact that the negotiators had factual “control” over the deal’s consequences, and would therefore bypass the negotiator and go directly to the ministers who had less competence in the area in question, and thus make the Capitol soften the position of it’s negotiating representative.

Closed Meetings
The third point we wish to point out is the use of so-called closed meetings. Despite the WTO’s rhetorical cloak of democracy and its frequent use of the words “openness” and “transparency”, the use of closed meetings is common practice. These meetings are held not only on an exclusionary basis, they are also kept secret. This is one of the reasons several developing countries have complained that texts have “appear[ed] from nowhere”. Up until Seattle these meetings included no more than 20-30 countries, all selected by the so-called neutral chair, but not much changed after this. More members are now included, though nothing has changed in the sense that these meetings still occur, and that they are still arranged secretly. This despite comments from economical “big shots”, such as the Norwegian foreign minister Knut Vollebæk, who commented: “One cannot continue with global trade negotiations where 20 countries participate while the remaining 120 countries have to wait in the hallways.” (Aftenposten 3.12.99)
The included participants vary, but the EU and the USA are always included. Trend wise, common participating countries in these meetings are the countries also known as the “friends of the chair” and heavy-weighters in terms of population and economy such as India, Malaysia and China. Smaller and poorer developing countries are rarely included, yet it is in these “rooms of consultation” that most of the groundwork for the paper to be voted on in is laid. The paper is of course not final until it has been agreed upon through consensus, but due to factors previously discussed, opposition to such a paper is, more often than not, extremely difficult.

Wanted: Reform
As I have shown here, the WTO is in dire need of democracy. Much of the theoretical foundation can be said to exist, but practice can be seen as little else than a corruption of the idea. Criticism of the WTO is many faceted, and even the most ardent opposition groups disagree on their goals as to what kinds of changes are needed. Some see removal, others see reform. Yet one thing remains clear – to retain or obtain any form of legitimacy, there needs to be a process of democratisation. Several such reforms are possible within the given structure, others require huge changes within the organization itself. Some of the more realistic reforms can easily be laid out. For one, it is possible to have stricter rules concerning the Secretariat with quotas relating to membership on a national basis. Furthermore, to avoid bilateral pressure, voting should occur on an anonymous basis. And thirdly the closed meetings should be made accessible to all member states. These reforms will not please the most ardent opposition, but it will go a long in making the WTO into a more acceptable organization, make the negotiations fairer and the results will hopefully, as a consequence of this, have a closer correlation to the interest of the developing countries.